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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

PEARL ANN HOLDAWAY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
Case No.

vs.

12836

ROGER VERNON HALL,
)
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a jury verdict on a personal
injury case for the plaintiff, plaintiff claiming special
damages in the sum of $3,683.50 for an injured finger
alleged to have been caused by willful battery. Defendant claimed that any injury was accidental or negligent.
The jury returned a verdict of $3,683.50 special damages, $7 ,000 general damages, and $10,000 punitive
damages. The defendant moved for a new trial on the
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basis of error and excessive damages. The trial judge
ordered a remittitur of $5,000 of the punitive damages
and denied a new trial.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant seeks a reversal and new trial.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff and defendant had been going together
frequently from July of 1968 until January of 1969,
including bowling as partners in a league once a week
(R-77). On the 31st day of January (later changed to
the 25th of January on amendment allowed by the Court
to conform to the doctors' records, R-16) they went to
the bowling alley together, had a falling out, she left
the bowling alley, and went home with her sister and
brother-in-law (R-81). She locked and barricaded the
door. She testified she saw the defendant come across
the street, try the back door, and then come to the
front door and broke in, grabbed her hand and "threw
me back" (R-85) . The police arrived almost immedi·
ately (R-89).
She claimed to have been working at Albertson's
for $120.00 per week take home pay (R-89), but admitted on cross-examination that her gross pay was
$2.47 per hour on a 40 hour week (R-122). She claimed
to have worked as a grocery checker at Albertson's
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or Warshaw's until the time of her injury, but could
produce no W-2 forms on demand from either store
for the year 1969 (R-120 and 122).
She denied bowling or going out with the defendant
after the injury. She went to Dr. Cutler on what she
testified to be January 25, which was later amended
to be January 31. He charged her $20.00 (R-18). Dr.
Cutler referred her to Dr. Clayton in April, some two
months after the injury. Dr. Cutler x-rayed but found
no fracture (R-117). She testified she told Dr. Clayton
the defendant had bent her hand back and injured her
finger (R-124). Dr. Clayton's testimony and his records show she told him it was "injured in an accident
about three months ago." He further testified that on
examination the flexion and extensor tendons were
within normal limits and the fingers extended to the
normal limits and moved to full extension ( R-96) .
Plaintiff testified she was hospitalized for a week. The
hospital records (Exhibit 14-P) show she was hospitalized for thirty-six hours (R-168).
The defendant testified as to the relationship
between he and the plaintiff, as to an argument on the
date of the injury (R-179), that they had discussed
matrimony (R-180), they argued through bowling; she
went home alone. He followed, broke in and was talking
to her. She reached for the wall telephone to call the
police and he tried to take it away, and her finger was
injured (R-181). They went out together several
times after the injury, including bowling and dates and
for coffee (R-181).
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He received a summons in May of 1970, one and
a half years later ( R-182) .
DAMAGES
With regard to special damages, the only evidence
in the record is:
a) The following exhibits to which reasonableness
of the charges was stipulated without admission of liability: Exhibit 9-P, anehthesiologist, $45.00; Exhibit
10-P, Dr. Clayton, $160.00; Exhibit 13-P, medicine
and splint, $11.00; Exhibit 15-P, hospital bill, $303.95,
for a total of $519.95.
b) In addition thereto, there was testimony of Dr.
Cutler ( R-118) of a bill of $20.00. Testimony regarding
a bill of a Dr. Bateman for psychiatric visits prior to
the injury (Exhibit 8-P), was not offered.
c) Plantiiff testified as to the value of a screen
door, $10.00, a door, $75.00, and a sweater, $30.00, for
a total of $115.
The grand total is $654.95.
With regard to the items under "c", there was no
foundation as to value and no claim for property dam·
age in the pleadings (Complaint, R-1). The Court
instructed at Instruction 13, last paragraph (R-50),
that special damages could not exceed $3,683.50, to
which the defendant took exception (R-204). At R-138,
after verdict, defense counsel notified the Court of his
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intent to move the Court to set the verdict aside on the
basis of the finding on special damages, but deferred his
motion due to the absence of plaintiff's counsel. The
Court replied:
"The Court will take the view that they cannot
recover more special damages than they prove."
(R-209).
INSTRUCTIONS
Although the defendant's defense was accident and
negligence, together with contributory negligence, the
Court refused to submit the defendant's theory to the
jury by refusing to give instructions on accident, negligence or contributory negligence (R-200), and further
refused to give an instruction on intent (R-201), to
which the defendant duly excepted. The Court also
gave an instruction on trespass, although no trespass
was pleaded.
CONDUCT OF THE .JURY
The jury, after retiring, came back with a query:
"We have namely a question as to the amount
of damages that may be awarded in this case."
(R-204-206).
The Court gave a partial reinstruction on damage instructions. Twenty minutes later the jury came in announcing they had reached a verdict ( R-136) . The
Court asked for the verdict, but the jury was not aware
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they had jury forms and filled them in in the box
(R-207). Counsel notified the Court of his intention
to make a motion.
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
Defense counsel filed a motion for new trial (R-58),
based on Rule 59 (a) (1) and 59 (a) ( 6), Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure. After hearing on the motion (un.
reported) , during which counsel agreed that there was
not over $800 in special damages at a maximum, the
Court urged counsel to try and settle the case, and on
February 10, 1972, entered a judgment leaving the
special and general damages as in the verdict and
reducing punitive damages by $5,000 ( R-65) . De·
f endant made timely appeal
POINTS ON APPEAL
POINT I
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO
INSTRUCT THE JURY ON THE DEFEND·
ANT'S THEORY OF THE CASE.
POINT II
THE JURY FAILED TO FOLLOW THE
INSTRUCTIONS OF THE COURT AND IG·
NORED THE INSTRUCTIONS AND PLEAD·
INGS SENT TO THE JURY ROOM, INCLUD·
ING THE VERDICT FORMS.
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POINT III
THE DAMAGES WERE EXCESSIVE IN
ALL THREE CATEGORIES AND MORE
PARTICULARLY IN THE AREA OF SPECIAL DAMAGES.
POINT IV
INSUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
TO JUSTIFY THE VERDICT.
POINT V
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO
GRANT A NEW TRIAL.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO
INSTRUCT THE JURY ON THE DEFENDANT'S THEORY OF THE CASE.
The defendant contended that the injury to the
plaintiff was occasioned by accident or negligence in
his attempt to take the phone away from her. There
was evidence to support his theory in addition to his
own testimony (Plaintiff's Exhibit 14-P). The hospital admitting diagnosis of Dr. Clayton states:
"This patient had the ring finger accidentally
injured about three months ago."
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Defendant requested his theory of the case in his ,
answer and in his requested instructions 3, 4, 5 and 7
all of which were refused by the Court, the Court using'
the following language at R-200-201:
!

"THE COURT: After listening to this evi·
dence, I am not going to give any instruction
on accident, negligence or contributory negligence. The evidence is clear that this was a forced
entrance into the home, that any thought of
friendly or affectionate relationship between
these parties had been terminated at the time
Mr. Hall broke into the residence. The matter ,
is going to be submitted wholly on the question
of whether or not there was assault and battery,
whether there was any injury as a result of the
battery; if so, the extent of the injuries and the
amount of damages that plaintiff would be en·
titled to.
!

1

MR. HATCH: May I assume under that theory
that the Court would give an instruction on the
question of the necessity of intent in assault
and battery?
THE COURT: With respect to intent, the
Court will only give a definition of assault, a
definition of battery, and an instruction if the
jury finds there was a battery that the plaintiff
will be entitled to such damages as proximately
resulted from such battery.
Intent in an assault and battery as a criminal
matter is of great importance. In a civil action
for assault and battery, the jury will determi?e
whether there was intent to do what plaintiff
claimed was done from the facts and circum·
stances of the occurrence."
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!

The cases are almost without exception that both
sides are entitled to have their theory of the case presented to the jury for a determination of fact if there
is any evidence to support that theory. (See 53 Am.
Jur. 2d, Trial, Sec. 649 at page 500, citing cases.) The
Court entirely deprived the defendant of the defenses
pleaded and let the case go to the jury on plaintiff's
theory alone.

POINT II
THE JURY FAILED TO FOLLOW THE
INSTRUCTIONS OF THE COURT AND IGNORED THE INSTRUCTIONS AND PLEADINGS SENT TO THE JURY ROOM, INCLUDING THE VERDICT FORMS.
The jury apparently entirely ignored the Court's
instructions as to special damages, finding special
damages as requested in the complaint in the sum of
$3,683.53, when a thorough canvass of the entire
record shows evidence of only $654.95 (see Statement
of Facts where the damages are detailed with record
or exhibit citation thereto). Even the $654.95 on which
there was some proof includes $115.00 for a door, a
screen door and a sweater though there was no property
damage claimed in the pleadings nor any amendment
for such property damage. This amounts to an approximate one sixth of the special damages in the jury's
verdict.
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The defendant took due exception to the court'i !
instructions on damages, specifically excepted to the i
special damge figures in Instruction 13 ( R-204). The:
defendant also indicated a motion for new trial on·
special damages (R-209), with the Court stating:
"The Court will take the view that they cannot
recover more specials than they prove."
On motion for new trial, the Court ignored the
proof of special damages and entered a verdict for
special damages some six times the amount proved.

POINT III
THE DAMAGES WERE EXCESSIVE IN
ALL THREE CATEGORIES AND MORE
PARTICULARLY IN THE AREA OF SPE·
CIAL DAMAGES.
There can be no argument that the jury returned
a verdict for special damages in the full amount alleged
in the complaint which is almost six times the maximum
amount of damages on which any proof shows in the
record. The judgment for special damages was in
the sum of $3,683.50 and the maximum amount proved
was $654.95. (See Statement of Facts wherein all
damages testified to are itemized and page number
given.) (See JIFU, page 166, Section 90.6, and Berry
v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Company, 324 Mo.
775, 26 s.w. 2d 988).
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It is apparent that the jury gave the maximum
damages alleged in the complaint with no consideration
of those proved or even attempted to be proved in the
plaintiff's case. It is also apparent from the minor
nature of the injury that the verdicts for general punitive damages are excessive to the extent that they
should "shock the conscience of the Court." Also the
award, when compared with awards for other similar
injuries, is clearly excessive. (See 22 Am. J ur. 2d,
Damages, Sec. 380, et seq., and 16 A.L.R. 2d 173,
et seq.)

POINT IV
INSUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
TO JUSTIFY THE VERDICT.
It is heretofore pointed out in Point III, supra,
that there was no evidence whatsoever of special damages in excess of $654.95, yet the jury awarded
$3,683.50 special damages. There is no competent
evidence of loss of earnings in the record and little as
to permanent nature of the injury to the damaged fourth
finger. Yet the jury awarded $7,000 general damages
and $10,000 punitive damages (later reduced by the
trial court on motion for new trial to $5,000 punitive).
All of this for a partial loss of extension in one knuckle
of one finger.

The jury's attitude
clear when they
queried the Court as to the amount of damages that
may be awarded in the case (R-204) and then came
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back almost immediately with the excessive amounts of
damages now contained in the verdict though they
hadn't been over the papers sent with them to the jury
room to find that they had verdict forms with them
(R-207). The verdict was filled in in the jury box
(R-207).

POINT V
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO
GRANT A NEW TRIAL.
Defendant made proper and timely motion for
new trial ( R-58 and 59) , and after hearing arguments
reduced the punitive damages by $5,000 and otherwise
entered judgment on the verdict (R-65).
The Court at that time was fully aware that nothing
in excess of $650 special damages had been proved or
had proof been offered as to any greater amount. The
Court was also aware that the defendant excepted to
the amount in the special damages instruction (R-204),
and had indicated to counsel that "the Court will take
the view that they cannot recover more specials than
they can prove" (R-209). Still the Court, on motion
for new trial, left the special damages as returned in
the verdict even though the plaintiff's counsel made
no contention that a greater amount had been proved
than the $654.95 claimed by defense counsel. The Court
should have granted a new trial.
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SUMMARY
It is clear that the damages are excessive and
could only have been arrived at under a basis of passion
and prejudice. The instructions as to damages were in
error. The Court wholly and willfully refused to instruct as to defendant's theory of the case.
It is respectfully requested that the Court reverse
the verdict and remand to the lower court for a new
trial

Respectfully submitted,
HATCH, McRAE & RICHARDSON
By Sumner J. Hatch
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant
707 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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